What are we talking about when we merge knowledge, organizations and passion together? Although this may seem a somewhat eccentric question, it in fact highlights a very simple and everyday relation. We are talking about the importance of the expressive relation and attachment to the world and the limit of a purely instrumental and economic view of human activity: the idea that people do what they do for the love of what they do and not for the money.
This relation requires brief historical contextualization. The oppositional and hierarchical relationship between emotion and rationality, with the latter term predominating over the former, is a relatively recent phenomenon. As noted by Elias (1994) , the individual control and the public regulation of emotions are a central part of the process of modernization. The removal or deferral of emotions and passions from the public and organizational sphere can thus be fully identifi ed as one of the main features of the project of modernity.
Things, however, used to be different. Many of the 17th-century writers were concerned with the passions as a source of self-knowledge, selfcontrol, and power over others; and they were moving away from the treatment of passions embedded in discussion of vice and virtue. Most of these works are not well-known today, even if they contributed to an early philosophy of mind (James, 1997). The 17th century was marked by a growing spirit of inquiry 'that moved from experience to generalization, The Passion for Knowing Silvia Gherardi et al. and production is a consequence of the historical confl ation (or confusion) between what she calls labour and work. While labour is a function of biological and economic necessity, work is intrinsically creative rather than merely reproductive. As such, work and passion cannot be thought of in complete opposition. Schwalbe (1986) , addresses the unexamined affective dimension of Marx's analysis of labour. He argues that a pivotal dimension of work is its aesthetic and passionate character. All activities have an aesthetic dimension to the extent that the actor experiences 'an appreciation of the end value of the act as the act is being carried out' (Schwalbe, 1986: 64) . Such dimension is strategically underplayed in the capitalist mode of production. By concealing the aesthetic experience derived from the manipulatory phase, and focussing exclusively on the consummation phase, capitalism promises to repair alienation through material consumption, thus fuelling an endless circuit of domination through consumerism. Passion, in the neutral sense of pathos, although often invisible, hidden or repressed, is thus a key ingredient of what Schwalbe (1986) calls 'natural' (as opposed to alienated) work. Such passion can be found in almost all human activities, and it is not relegated to such specifi c spheres as those of art or leisure. Accordingly, passion is an inherent trait which is not limited to the increasingly common type of work that Freidson (1990) would defi ne 'labor of love', e.g. working for a charity or for an 'alternative' organization. Passion, unrecognized and unexplored, is an ingredient of most human activities-such as Spinoza argued against Hobbes (Bodei, 1991 )-provided we are ready to critically interrogate the conventional attachment of work, or labour to economy and exchange.
This Special Issue begins with an invited essay 1 by Pasquale Gagliardi which refl ects on these topics and on the development of intellectual debate in organization studies over the past 30 years. His point of departure is the observation that while considered legitimate today, passion as a topic was previously censored within the spirit of the discipline. How has this happened, and what does it teach us?
Within the modernist knowledge project, organizational discourse was constructed and intellectually organized on the basis of the dualism between utility and gratuitousness, and of the hierarchical order between these two terms, where the former prevailed over and dominated the latter. Consequently, the literature, and also, the awareness itself of organization scholars, privileged interpretative categories which, on the basis of the value ascribed to utility, engendered a socially constructed blindness to all experience that could not be related to instrumentality, rationality, and utilitarianism. Thus, as modern scientifi c knowledge was formed, the dimension of pathos gave way to those of logos and ethos. But the return of pathos-which Gagliardi explains in light of the spread of qualitative and ethnographic methods and the greater sophistication of theoretical concepts-has expanded our understanding of what constitutes 'knowledge'. Introduction One contribution that this Special Issue intends to make to the study of organization is consequently to broaden the concept of organizational knowledge so that it encompasses intellectual and sensory knowledge as well. Organizational knowledge is not solely mental. It is not situated in the brain of the human body or the organization; nor do the body or the organization serve as its instruments. Valorizing pathos in organization studies is giving salience to the corporeality of sensitive-aesthetic knowledge and to organizational action undertaken through the senses (Strati, 2007) . It emphasizes the ability to express judgements based on taste, and to live the social practices performed in organizations with emotion, affect and attachment. Pathos in understanding organizational life requires due scholarly attention to be paid to the intimate, confused, and ambiguous relations among feeling, thinking and acting in the world of experience. This world is material and social even when it reveals its impalpability in, for example, the work and organizational practices concerned with the virtual domain of information and telecommunication technologies.
If we consider organizational knowledge no longer in terms of 'onedimensional knowledge' (to paraphrase Marcuse)-and therefore not as cognitive and mental knowledge based on thought, or indeed restricted to only the rational thought capable of causally modelling social and post-social relations (Knorr-Cetina, 2006) in organizational settings-then much of the organizational literature will leave us disappointed and dissatisfi ed. For a large part of the organizational discourse, as regards both representations of organizational lives and the methods and epistemologies of the social research which produces them, is a censorial narrative that seeks to 'rationalize', 'sterilize' and 'moralize' everyday organizational life. Such disclosure is consequently able to recount neither the plurality of the experiential forms of organizational knowledge and action, nor the human richness embedded in them.
Refl ecting upon, deconstructing, and destabilizing the interpretative categories of a discipline comprising such a large body of theoretical and empirical analysis as organization studies requires interrogation of the politics of knowledge and the effects thereon of the dominant discourses. In this regard, it is of interest to include other disciplinary areas, so that forms of organizational knowledge can interact with other approaches to the study of contemporary society. Thus possible will be a view of organizational life obtained through the eyes of other disciplines concerned with the issue of the politics of knowledge. This is the purpose of the second invited essay in this Special Issue. Written by the feminist philosopher Carla Locatelli, it examines the complex social phenomena bound up with the everyday nature of social and post-social relations in organizations.
The ambiguity of the categories used to interpret attachment to the world, or love, is paradigmatic for interpretation of value and power relations. 'Love', writes Locatelli (p. 339) , is the 'stereotype of passive caregiving ascribed to women's "natural" loving attitude' which often justifi es The Passion for Knowing Silvia Gherardi et al.
'women's exploitation in the most diverse social situations', and which implies that 'the domain of women's knowledge is just "emotional", "emphatic", "timic"'-although, in truth, it generally signifi es that 'women's knowledge is illogical, non-objective, and engrossed'. We again fi nd here the effects of representation in binary terms explored by Gagliardi. Rationality is inscribed in the domain of instrumentality, utilitarianism, logos and the male, while emotionality is inscribed in pathos, gratuitousness and the female. But just as art suffers from being segregated in museums and in the sphere of leisure-time entertainment, so love suffers from being segregated in the sphere of femaleness. Locatelli's essay suggests that love should be conceived not (only) as emotion, but also as action, and that we should consequently interrogate the politics of desire. The politics of knowledge and desire are the core themes of this Special Issue, and they induce examination of the knowing subject and the type of knowledge that it produces. The theme of passion foregrounds relationality, proximity and attachment. These, in their turn, display empathy with the world but also the potential destructiveness and self-destructiveness of that bond. By contrast, the image of dispassionate, objective and rational knowledge is constructed on the spatial metaphor of distance, uninvolvement and estrangement. As we shall see, this theoretical register traverses all the articles in this Special Issue. Indeed, almost all the authors examine, each in his/her own way, the social responsibility of creating, proposing, representing and communicating organizational knowledge. They assign this responsibility to the education system, as well as to 'experts' like ourselves as intellectual workers. But Locatelli's article does so even more forcefully by giving voice to the feminist refl ection on gender as politics of knowledge (whose knowledge is considered legitimate knowledge?) and quoting Luce Irigaray (1996) : 'Can the "I" separated from the "she" count (or even fi gure), as an agent of knowledge?'. We shall address this question by translating it as follows: can an organizational knowledge purged of pathos be considered knowledge?
The theme of passion for knowledge and in knowledge prompts further refl ection regarding organization studies. Such refl ection concerns:
• How a non-instrumental conception of knowledge activates unconventional styles of research, and leads to the identifi cation, invention and communication of forms of organizational understanding based on the revision of analytical and interpretative categories or the construction of new ones • How the sociology of attachment reveals unusual aspects of the connections among those who work, the objects of their work, and the subjective and objective meanings of work and of organizing work relations • The results of valorizing forms of sensible knowledge in terms of the theory on organizations and organizing. Introduction
This approach has antecedents and corollaries that are apparent in the essays collected. They include: the strand of studies concerned with aesthetic knowledge about and within organizations (Strati, 1999) ; the potential role of the humanities in refounding managerial knowledge and in promoting an extended notion of knowledge that also comprises character formation (Gagliardi, 2006) ; and the 'mystery-driven' knowledge (Gherardi, 1999) related to non-knowledge and practical knowledge (Nicolini et al., 2003) .
Before proceeding, we would specify that the term 'passion' does not denote some univocal and easily defi nable phenomenon. Rather, it is a polysemous term able, in certain respects, to comprise meanings that may even be contradictory: for instance the simultaneous feeling of pleasure and pain. In this regard, passion has a feature in common with the aesthetic category of the sublime as comprising beauty both intense and painful.
Passion in Knowledge and for Knowledge and the Study of Organizations
How can it be argued that knowing is a mundane activity which mobilizes emotions and desires, creates bonds and attachments, and produces pleasure and pain? This task is undertaken by Steve Linstead and Joanne Brewis, who converse with the two invited essays preceding their own.
Whilst Gagliardi and Locatelli deal with the dualisms of utility versus gratuitousness, and rationality versus emotionality, Linstead and Brewis argue that the heuristic and emancipating value of the idea of a passionate knowing is strictly dependent on a non-domesticated reading of the idea of passion, a reading which does not reduce the latter to something else-be it need, aspirant desire as the fulfi lment of a lack, or motivation.
Linstead and Brewis recall the etymology of the terms 'passion' and 'desire' to highlight the duplicity and ambiguity of their roots. In Latin, passion conveyed a sense of pain and suffering, and also of passivity. For passion, like love, may be destructive and anything but pleasurable. Those prey to their own passions or those of others are passive: they have lost or relinquished control over themselves. Constructed on the myth of control over oneself and the situation is the image of the volitive and volitional actor: the self-made man (sic!) master of his destiny in the world of organizations created by industrial capitalism. By contrast, being prey to one's passions is indicative not only of intensity of feeling but also of dubious morality and a weakness of will. Moreover, passion binds a person to his/her body, because it is the latter which desires. When the mind is discursively separated from the body, it becomes the seat of knowledge uncontaminated by physical urges and a desiring body. It becomes, for our purposes here, the non-material locus of the sociology of organizations, of organization theories, and management studies-the non-corporeal intermediary of organizational life.
Here, we may again intermingle organizational analysis with other disciplines. In the history of Western philosophy. 'Aristotle', write Linstead
The Passion for Knowing Silvia Gherardi et al. and Brewis (p. 355) , used the general term orexis 'to indicate the natural human desire to know'. This desire calls for practical reason because 'it causes humans to reach out for something or someone'. In fact, someone who 'does not reach out, or has no desire, is anorexic'. The desire to know is therefore intrinsic to human nature and, as suggested by the etymology of the Latin term desiderium (de + sidu mening 'toward a celestial object'), it is the force that drives outwards and upwards towards the Other as if it were a 'heavenly body'.
Linstead and Brewis's interpretation of desire as fl ow-in light of the philosophical refl ections of George Bataille and Alexandre Kojève-is set in opposition to interpretations of desire as 'lack of'. The intransitive use of the verb 'desire' enables desire to be viewed as a desiring state: as an amorphous urge-the authors contend (p. 356)-which 'lies beneath our basic curiosity about and willingness to engage with the world'. It is in this sense that the Special Issue proposes a reading of 'knowing as desiring ', 2 or in other words, of desire as an epistemological mode to know about the world through the relation that ties the knowing subject to it. Desire constitutes this basic curiosity about the world and willingness to engage with it. As Linstead and Brewis well illustrate (p. 356), the 'reconceptualization of desire as fl ow allows for "non-knowledge", "the passion for not knowing" (Bataille, 2001: 196) , whereby we are drawn to things around us even when they seem at best ambivalent or counterproductive, and at worst threaten to overwhelm or imperil us'.
But Linstead and Brewis's intention is not only to specify a philosophical conception of desire. They also use the conception as the basis for two 'cautionary tales' on how organization studies have appropriated the notion of desire for knowledge and tamed it within a discourse of control. Two constructs in particular have anaesthetized desire in organization studies: its routinization and reduction to motivation, which evinces an endeavour to tame desire; and the discourse of knowledge management that constructs knowledge as something that can be managed/tamed and bent to the organization's will.
Is this to operationalize the concepts of desire and knowledge for practical purposes, or is it to enfeeble the concept of desire for knowledge? The three articles that follow the one by Linstead and Brewis refl ect on the topic in light of empirical research. They provide a detailed description of how passion is expressed in desire and through the desire for knowledge in work and organizational settings.
Landscapes of Organizational Knowledge and Passion
The connection among work, the workplace and the object of work is a subjective relation made up of love and hate, obsession and pleasure, exploration and passionate knowledge. In the words of one of the sailors interviewed by Kathy Mack, it is 'feeling alive there'. Consequently, there is a bond of passion with what we do that makes us 'present' when doing Introduction it, and also with the place where we do it. The aesthetic knowledge that springs from the senses and from the corporeality present in situation is a way of being in-relation with ourselves and with the world. At the same time it is to relate and communicate with those who have the same passion as ourselves by sharing stories, memories and a 'state of mind'.
The fi rst of the three articles which explore the relationship between passion and work describes the passion felt by sailors for the sea and for seascapes. The sea is the workplace of sailors, and the sense of place and the aesthetics of the natural environment are parts of their occupation. Being a competent member of the 'blue water workforce' means knowing what a passion for the sea signifi es, recognizing the relation between certain odours and the memories that they evoke, sensing that places have histories and stories, and that these histories and stories form part of individual and collective biography. Mack explores the aesthetic (but also unaesthetic) relationship between the seafaring occupation and the sense of the place in which it is performed. She argues that, because the sea always exceeds the limits of the frame, it becomes both a source of the sublime and an obsession. The sea is to sailor what the object of research work is to Knorr Cetina's scientists: an endless source of attraction and pathos that becomes an inexhaustible and incontrollable lure. In this sense, her analysis can be extended to other occupations as well. And in fact, the aesthetic bond between individual, workplace, object of work and the community of workers is again apparent among the mathematicians studied by Paolo Landri, or in the community of Weblog producers described by Kaiser and colleagues.
What Kathy Mack's article highlights is the materiality of the passional bond. The passion for knowledge is anchored in the corporeality and physicality of the work setting. The 'sense of place' constitutes the symbiotic connection between aesthetic knowledge and the multisensorial experiences of people at work. Workplaces are not abstract containers of equally abstract activities. Rather, they are actively appropriated and interiorized by:
• The body and its perceptive faculties (feeling, seeing, smelling, hearing and tasting): intrinsic to all of these faculties is the sensitive-aesthetic judgement • The community of workers, which develops a vocabulary to communicate those sensations, learn and distinguish them, to enjoy them (or be repelled by them), and to transmit them to new members • The discursive practices that give shape to the negotiative processes which give rise to the aesthetic categories used in organizational action, which develop and stabilize an aesthetic knowledge conserved in the community's work practices, and which pass aesthetic judgement on the beauty or ugliness of one practice compared to another.
Aesthetic knowledge is passionate knowledge; just as passion is the aesthetic relationship with the world, both because it passes through The Passion for Knowing Silvia Gherardi et al.
the senses, and because it underpins the aesthetic judgements with which a community relates to the work practices that distinguish it. Aesthetic judgements about the workplace, its natural environment, and the persons who perform it, socially sustain work practices. Paolo Landri's study of a school of mathematicians theorizes passion as 'active conditioning', where the explicit reference is to a sociology of attachments (Hennion, 1993) . Whether studied in a community of enthusiasts (for music, drugs, wine) or in a community of practitioners, passion is considered to be an activity which weaves together the individual, the community, the knowledge object, and the environment in which these relations arise. As an activity, passion creates continuity between what are apparently opposites: in the words of Gomart and Hennion (1999: 227) between 'passivity and activity, determining and determined, collective and individual, and intention as against causality'.
The mathematicians of the Naples school demonstrate how passion for the knowledge object is a force which creates community and identity. It drives the discussion within the epistemic community on what constitutes good and elegant mathematical practice, and thus enables the practice itself to be innovated. Landri's article depicts passion not just as an emotion or an individual relationship, but as a situated practice of knowledge transmission, and as a historically situated cultural practice of meaning creation, belonging, community, and organization. Hence, the passion for the knowledge object which underpins an occupation or a skill is also an 'organizing' practice: it creates organizations, and organized groups within organizations. Passion therefore socially sustains work practices, and the continuing practise of the latter requires constant discussion among the practitioners on what constitutes a good practice. Weber (1919) wrote that there is a vocation (Beruf ), or calling, in professions. Does not being 'called', in the secular sense, represent the intimate and passionate relationship with what one does? Landri adds a pragmatic dimension to this view by showing that the maintenance and transmission of passion is a social practice within work practices. The mathematicians of Naples, whom Landri studies by historically reconstructing the life of their charismatic leader, formed a school within the mathematics before World War II and created a school of thought which was able to survive through the routinization of passion.
Passion can be seen as the situated mobilization of feelings, understandings, identities, practices and organizations, which unfolds on appropriate occasions. Passion is therefore socially produced and reproduced, and it sustains both the object of mathematicians' work and their identity, as well as the material organization of doing mathematics at a particular time.
The passion-mobilizing practices described by Landri-and which can be found in other professional communities which work with knowledge-are celebrating talent, arguing about work practices with other communities of practitioners, socially constructing the beauty of the knowledge object, founding the division of labour on competence, extolling the community, and keeping its memories alive. Introduction Passion as the attachment of people in knowledge-related practices is also described as technologically-mediated passion in the article by Stephan Kaiser, Gordon Müller-Seitz, Miguel Lopes and Miguel Pina e Cunha. Their contribution leads us through the landscape of the Blogoshere, 3 and prompts us to ask whether there is a difference between looking at the sea with passion and gazing at a computer screen. These are two different panoramas which can be taken to be paradigmatic of a love for nature and a love for technology. It is possible to lose oneself in both the sea and the computer screen: we may surrender to both of them in an act of love; both can make us suffer. Technoscapes are today's new ecosystems, and they are also a new source of metaphors for knowledge and the collective imagination.
The term 'Blogoshere' denotes the set of Weblogs interconnected by various means of interlinking on the internet and constituting a distinctive IT-instantiated media ecosystem. As a metaphor it evokes a lifestyle, a post-capitalist ethic (Himanen, 2001) , the cultural movement of open source development, and practices of freedom and communality. The Blogoshere is therefore a technological medium of high symbolic value embedded in strongly ideologized interpretative frames. In a certain sense, it is an ideal setting in which to study knowledge production and circulation practices, and it well represents passion for knowledge for its own sake. Open source embodies a community which voluntarily devotes time and energy to producing a knowledge-intensive good developed collaboratively. In this case, technology is the environment of the cooperation as well as its medium and purpose. The gratuitousness of this collaboration generally resists instrumental explanation, and is therefore construed in terms of 'passion'. But in what does this passion consist, and what drives the practice of Weblogging?
The authors use the standard terms of motivation theory, distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic motives. Within this framework they show that technological mediation gives rise to new discursive practices, and therefore to diverse forms of participation in discourses on practices. Their reasoning on the passion for knowledge proceeds as follows. They begin by arguing that Weblogging mingles pleasure with suffering, and that passion as the experience of pain and suffering arises during fl ow states (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997) which occur while reading, commenting upon, and writing Weblog entries.
According to Kaiser and colleagues (p. 405), fl ow states are self-motivating experiences 'that can be characterized roughly as an intense and focused concentration whereby action and awareness are merged so that temporal awareness is distorted'. Pleasure resides in fl ow, in the fi t between the difficulty of the task and the competence of the person, while anxiety or boredom characterizes the misfi t.
Desire for this kind of pleasure can be described as passion for an activity as an end in itself, or as a state of grace in which the distinction between the The Passion for Knowing Silvia Gherardi et al. self and the world disappears and pleasure is experienced as the plenitude of self and absence of desire. Domination over technology is the moment when the latter becomes incorporated into the subject and the activity, so that there is only 'presence' or fl ow.
Can cyberspace as rarefaction of space and time more easily produce the pleasure of fl ow? The experience of Weblog practitioners shows that it can, even when the fl ow is accompanied by suffering and comprises passion's two semantic referents: suffering and attraction.
However, Kaiser and colleagues are less interested in the subjective dimension of attachment to work for its pleasure's sake than they are in the collective dimension of Weblogging as a social practice which creates its community of practitioners. In this latter context, the authors argue, the motives of Webloggers are extrinsic and based on social recognition and the reputation acquired as an expert practitioner. This interpretation echoes the fi ndings in the literature on communities of practices, but the authors add a further dimension: that where the Blogosphere is a specifi c context of practices. In what sense is now explained.
We have seen in the cases of seamen and mathematicians that passion for knowledge and in knowing are mediated by and anchored in corporeality and materiality, and also in conversations both direct and indirect. Webloggers evidence that technological mediation heightens the pleasure intrinsic to work by intensifying and 'densifying' the discursive practices that sustain work practices. If we base our interpretation on the distinction between talking in practice and talking about practice (Gherardi, 2006) , we fi nd that the Weblog is a large discursive ecosystem in which practitioners develop knowledge through discourse both about practice and in practice. We have seen the aesthetic dimension of talk about practice in the case of the Naples mathematicians who disputed on proofs, doing so at a time when they could only do so at a distance with published papers. Talk about practices keeps those practices alive, gains them accreditation in the community, and institutionalizes them. The Blogoshere has become a technological environment in which discursive practices determine participation in the community and anchor the passion for Weblogging itself. In regard to how the practices enabling participation in the discourse on practice come about, Kaiser and colleagues cite the following factors:
• Freedom to decide upon one's own involvement regarding the use of the Weblog (a practice of freedom); • The ability to have an impact in improving the software (a practice of direct participation); • The social bonds among Webloggers (a practice of social linking).
The passion for the object of knowing is therefore anchored in, and develops through, participation in the conversations that create and maintain the community. And technologies are important media for developing and maintaining attachment to the activity. Introduction
Bringing Passion and Invention Back on the Agenda
The Special Issue closes with an article by Pascal Dey and Chris Stayaert which refl ects critically on management education in business schools and furnishes an image-the troubadouresque-with which to explore and confi gure alternative knowledge-production based on the passion for knowledge: the love for wisdom and aesthetic understanding. This article completes the trajectory that began with the invited essays by making explicit the refl exive and metatheoretical concern with organizational knowledge-creation that traverses all the articles and inspires them in various ways. In other words, Dey and Steyaert's article directs our attention not only to teaching practices in management schools-in which many of the contributors to this Special Issue work-but also, and especially, to knowledge-production practices. It thus explicitly expresses a concern and a refl exive attitude regarding the passion for developing and communicating organizational knowledge of a more general kind.
We may say, in fact, that two lines of argument traverse all refl ection on the connection between passion and knowledge in and about organizations:
• The fi rst concerns passionate attachment to knowledge for its own sake.
This argument comprises a radical critique of the instrumentality of knowing, the commodifi cation of knowledge, and the view of knowledge as a new production factor-what Lyotard (1984) has called the 'performativity' of knowledge; • The second concerns a refl exive attitude in 'academic' writing-that is, personal and collective practices to 'produce knowledge' and the 'knowledge object'-which more or less openly questions its position in doing so, and the effects that these practices produce.
Consequently, refl ection on education can be viewed as refl ection on the work practices that unite organizational scholars as authors producing and reproducing institutionalized knowledge. This refl ection therefore concerns the crux of the debate on 'knowledge productive' practices: how can the McDonaldized dystopia of the educational institutions be subverted? The search for an answer proceeds by degrees, but it centres crucially on the image of an 'affi rmative invention'.
Dey and Steyaert describe a 'refl ective practice' based on Derrida's notion of deconstruction 'as a counter-force to the restrictive infl uence of end-orientation' (p. 11), on a 'culture of questioning' as defi ned by Giroux (2005) , and all the pedagogies in which knowledge and knowing are propelled by passion and mystery. The authors resume the critique against 'problem-driven' knowledge and explore the image of knowledge as relation with the unknown, the mysterious, the Other (Gherardi, 1999) . The concept proposed is that of unconditionality (and of the unconditional university): a sort of utopia 'which capitalizes on the tension between dream and reality, and which invites passion, dedication and play and seeks transformation without enforcing it' (p. 17). While Derrida's pedagogy combines passion and knowledge, Serres' combines critique and invention.
